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I. Introduction
Over the last fifteen years, the number of regional trade agreements have multiplied tremendously and largely as a result of slow progress made in the multilateral trade negotiations, under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The latest trend towards increased regionalism is the emergence of profound integration partnerships between countries which together make up a major share of the world population and/or GDP, also known as mega-regional trade agreements (MRTAs). In this context, the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration from the Tenth Ministerial Conference of the WTO held on 15-18
December 2015, in Nairobi, Kenya, reaffirmed "the need to ensure that Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) remain complementary to, not a substitute for, the multilateral trading system" 3 . Therefore, if MRTAs do not mark the end of multilateralism, they are still a clear expression of the desire by many economies to make progress on their trade integration agendas and thus the need for the multilateral trading system to adjust in a rapidly evolving world trade landscape. In terms of product composition of Africa's exports, primary commodities and raw materials (namely fuels, ores and metals, and agricultural raw materials) largely dominate to nearly all above markets (see Figure 2 ). Fuels alone represent shares of as much as 47. 6, 52.7, 62.3, 69.7, 76 .5 and 78.5 percent in Africa's total exports to TPP & RCEP, the Rest of the World, the EU, RCEP-9, TPP-4 and the U.S. for the average period 2010-2014, respectively. Within RCEP-9, China and India are not exceptions as 67.4 and 78.3 percent of Africa's total exports to China and India, respectively, are just fuels. Such data provide a clear illustration to the still limited industrial content of Africa's exports and the need for structural transformation to better support Africa's development through trade. In terms of origin of Africa's imports, similar patterns than in the case of exports are generally observed; with, however, a greater importance of Asian economies (i.e. RCEP-9
and the Rest of Asia) as sources of imports for Africa that should be highlighted (see Figure   3 ). Data, therefore, tend to suggest that exploring deepening of regional integration within Africa but also between Africa and countries from Asia, particularly those which do not belong to the three major MRTA configurations, could be seen as a positive avenue to help diversifying Africa's trade base.
III. Methodology used and policy reforms envisaged for the analysis

Methodology
The analysis is conducted using the well-know MIRAGE 11 multi-country multi-sector CGE model in its recursive dynamic version, particularly well suited to assess complex 11 MIRAGE stands for Modeling International Relationships in Applied General Equilibrium. Decreux and Valin (2007) . 13 Description of the GTAP version 8 database can be found in Narayanan et al. (2012) . 14 See Boumellassa et al. (2009) 
Envisaged policy reforms
In order to assess the trade impacts from the establishment of the three major MRTAs currently being envisaged on African economies, as well as some possible options to mitigate any potential losses for Africa, the following five policy reforms are envisaged: Jean et al. (2008) . In other words, an index which aims at identifying the commodities which are assumed to be import-sensitive by each member within its mega-regional bloc has been computed.
Precisely, the index defines the import-sensitive goods by combining the following three criteria: the products have high initial tariffs, they are highly traded, and they would have a large tariff reduction if their tariffs were to be cut and brought down to 0. As a consequence, higher values of the computed index correspond to the most import-sensitive products. Sensitive product lists is country-specific. It should be noted that for pairs of countries which both belong to RCEP as well as TPP (for example: Japan and Singapore) the sensitive product lists-between the two trading partners-defined for the RCEP is used (as initial protection in agriculture between RCEP members is in average higher than within TPP members 18 ). Regarding the number of sensitive products, it is determined using the (Minor and Hummels, 2011) . Trade costs estimated at the GTAP level of sector and country disaggregation are then aggregated further at the level defined for the CGE model which can be found in Annex 2. 25 percent reductions of these trade costs or "iceberg costs" were then applied, such as concretely customs procedures, port handling and inland transport in import and export processes are assumed to become 25 percent more efficient worldwide by 2020, as compared to that in the base year (i.e. 2015).
Finally, while the reforms are assumed to be effective by either 2017 or 2020, according to the scenario considered, outcomes are given for the year 2022. This is to allow for consistent comparisons across scenarios and also for all variables of the model to properly adjust to shocks. Unless otherwise indicated, these yearly outcomes are given by comparison between each of the scenarios and the baseline (i.e. reference scenario without any of the above defined trade reforms in place) either in percent or absolute changes.
is a strong opposition by some countries, an outcome on DDA issues, including AMA, is not to be excluded in the future. 20 While such option is considered for the modeling exercise, it should be noted that the TFA will only enter into force once at least two-thirds of the WTO members have completed their domestic ratification process. As of 20 January 2016, 67 WTO members (including 10 African countries) out of 164 have ratified the TFA; see https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/fac_20jan16_e.htm.
IV. Key findings from the modelling exercise
Findings from the CGE analysis indicate that as a result of the establishment of the three major MRTAs, their members would considerably expand their trade. Total exports of MRTA members (i.e. TTIP, TPP and RCEP all together) would increase by above $1 trillion by 2022 following the reforms-without trade facilitation measures being considered.
As illustrated on Figure 5 , it should be noted that RCEP countries would grab most of the overall trade benefits associated with the formation of the mega trade deals; with China alone grabbing nearly one-third of the gains. Africa's total exports would this time increase by USD 27.5 billion (or 3.0 percent). This net effect can be decomposed into a sharp decrease of Africa's exports to RCEP economies of USD 11.5 billion (or 6.0 percent) and a huge increase of USD 39.0 billion (or 5.3 percent) to other regions. It should be further noted that net expansion of Africa's exports to countries outside RCEP should itself be broken down into an impressive increase of USD 40.6 billion (or 39.9 percent) for intra-African trade and a decrease of USD 1.6 billion (or 0.3 percent) for Africa's exports directed towards non-RCEP countries outside the Continent.
As illustrated in Figure 7 , the establishment of the CFTA in parallel to MRTA reforms would divert an additional USD 1.1 billion of Africa's exports away from RCEP countries (essentially India and China) and limit or reduce Africa's exports to other non-African partners consequently to a re-orientation of Africa's exports towards African partners. percent of the overall intra-African trade benefits, in absolute terms, it should be indicated that, in percentage terms, South Africa's exports would actually increase by 52.8 percent which is considerable but still less than countries/regions like Tunisia, Madagascar, Tanzania, Morocco, Ethiopia, Egypt, the rest of SACU and Cameroon with increases of 115.0, 100.6, 96.5, 85.8, 85.7, 61.9, 59 .8 and 56.5 percent, respectively (see Figure 9 ). In fact, despite sizeable gains for South Africa, in both absolute and percentage terms, the influence of South Africa in intra-African trade would actually decrease when the CFTA is established in parallel of MRTAs compared to a baseline without those reforms; the share of South Africa's exports in total intra-African exports would be 13.4 percent with MRTAs and the CFTA in place against 16.9 percent in the absence of such reforms, in 2022.
Therefore, stating that the CFTA would mainly benefit big African economies is not It should be noted that as much as 45.9 percent of Africa's export gains when CFTA and RCEP are merged would be realized towards India alone; with about 80 percent of that share being expansion in exports of energy and mining products (see Figure 12 ). This is Specifically, the share of industrial products in Africa's exports' expansion to the fourteen RCEP countries, leaving aside India and China, would be 31.9 percent and the share for energy and mining would be 29.4 percent. In the case of China, the increase in industrial products is far more pronounced since 71.8 percent of the expansion in Africa's exports to China would be just industrial products, while the share for energy and mining would represent only 15.3 percent. Apart Madagascar, all African countries/regions considered in the analysis would see their exports of industrial products stimulated towards China; for 15 out of the 22 African countries/regions, exports of industrial products to China would increase by more than two-thirds, relative to the baseline in 2022 (see Figure 13 ).
Madagascar would also benefit from the trade reform but essentially thanks to large expansion in its exports of rice towards RCEP countries, other than China and India 28 . Source: Authors' calculations based on MIRAGE CGE model
As indicated in Figure 17 , the range of additional industrial products that Africa would be expected to export to non-RCEP Asian economies would actually be ample, including textile, wearing apparel and leather products, metal products, chemicals as well as electronic, machinery and transport equipments. It must also be emphasized that potential for Africa to expand its exports to Asia (excluding RCEP countries) of agricultural and food products, particularly meat products, cereals and crops would be substantial, especially to Turkey and the Rest of Asia (see Figure 16 ). tariffs are not as significant as they were two decades ago. Thus, the magnitude of the gains generated by a reduction of only 25 percent of just some of the existing non-tariff barriers surely is not a revelation. It should also be noted that 52.9 percent of the extra gains for Africa generated by the trade facilitation reforms would be for just industrial products.
Thus, trade facilitation measures would help further increasing the share of industrial products in Africa's total exports, providing extremely positive impetus to Africa's structural transformation efforts. This observation would hold whatever the destination of Africa's exports: Asia, Africa and third countries; thanks to costs to trade across borders reduced not only within Africa but also between Africa and the rest of the world.
30 Liberalization of trade in services was not envisaged in the analysis due to data limitation. 31 See section III of this Paper presenting methodology for more details. 
Africa's interest
While the analysis grounds itself from an African perspective, it is worth noting that deepening trade integration between Africa and its South-South partners would not just be in Africa's interest but largely benefits its counterparts as well.
A quick summary of the effects the different envisaged scenarios have on exports of all main countries/regions considered for the analysis is provided in Table 1 .
Firstly, as already seen at the beginning of the current section of the Paper on "Key findings from the modeling exercise", MRTA members would all see their exports increasing following establishment of the main three MRTAs. Conversely, exports would decline for all third countries. South-South partners. This is not a surprise considering that it is currently the first source of imports for African countries (see Figure 3) . 
V. Conclusion and policy recommendations
Findings from the analysis clearly indicate that Africa's CFTA is critical to mitigate expected negative trade effects that the formation of the three major MRTAs-namely, TTIP, with the European Union (EU), it would certainly be unsatisfactory to have lower tariffs imposed by African economies on their imports from the EU than from their African partners. Hence, the CFTA must be established before the EPAs are fully implemented by strategically using the transitional periods offered under EPA reforms (see Mevel et al., 2015) .
However, establishing the CFTA will certainly not be sufficient to ensure that Africa does not remain marginalized on a rapidly changing global trade landscape; Africa's share in global trade is only 3 percent today and it has barely evolved over the last twenty years. In that sense, Africa needs to also start looking beyond its own, and still relatively small, Continental market to expand its trade. MRTAs are an obvious expression of the need for many countries to quickly expand their trading relationships outside their own regions, and not waiting that substantial progress-as far as trade liberalization is concerned-are being made within the WTO framework. While surely invaluable, the multilateral trading system (MTS) must adjust to be able to provide a meaningful response to a growing number of larger and larger regional trade agreements so that those do not become a substitute to the MTS but rather complement it as per the objectives emphasized in Nairobi's Ministerial
Declaration of the WTO. and natural resources. It should be highlighted that skilled labor and capital are expected to be more substitutable between themselves than with other factors. Full employment of factor endowments is assumed through flexible wages that adjust so as to keep constant the level of activity in all regions. Whereas this assumption is strong and imperfectly reflects the reality, especially in the context of African economies, it is motivated by at least three reasons. Firstly, the full employment assumption is arguably more coherent with the medium to long term analysis of trade policy shocks, as the ones analyzed here (see Bouët et al. 2010) . Secondly, the reliability of unemployment (and under-employment) rates for
African economies-when available-can often raise serious doubts. Thirdly, while assuming fixed nominal or real wages to incorporate the presence of unemployment in CGE models is a feasible option, it is not necessarily more credible than the full employment hypothesis in particular in situations where informal employment is assumed to be very significant, as it thought to be the case in Africa. Indeed, postulating flexible wages could actually be more consistent with the wage determination's process in developing countries (see Ben Hammouda and Osakwe, 2006) . In the case of unskilled labor, imperfect mobility between agricultural and non agricultural sectors is assumed but perfect mobility is envisaged among each group of sectors. Skilled labor is perfectly mobile between sectors. Rates of variations of labor are exogenously set to the demographic forecast in line with corresponding data from World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Land is imperfectly mobile between sectors. Natural resources and capital are both sector-specific; with natural resources being constant and capital accumulative. Investment is the sole adjustment variable for capital stocks; such as the capital stock for the current year depends on the investment made for the same year and the capital stock from the previous year which has depreciated. Additionally, GDP growth is forecasted and affects total factor productivity 33 .
In each region, the current account is maintained constant and fixed to its initial value to ensure the macroeconomic closure of the MIRAGE CGE model. Therefore, any possible disequilibrium of the current account is to be offset by an adjustment of the real exchange rate. In other words, when trade is stimulated by a specific reform (e.g. reduction in tariff barriers) then the real exchange rates appreciate if exports increase more than the imports or depreciate when the exports increase less than the imports. 
